Abstract
Introduction
The above statement illustrates the official position of the Greek government and highlights the common notion shared by the Greek government and public that economic progress in Greece is closely related to monetary convergence with the European Union (EU) and the adoption of the Euro. According to this view, the convergence criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty almost a decade ago provide the blueprint for the beginning of a virtual cycle for Greece with low interest rates, low inflation, low unemployment (perhaps in the long-run) and sustained per capita income growth.
International economists who focus on relative comparisons tend to view these type of statements with skepticism. Since its birth on January 1 st , 1999, the Euro has declined by about 20 percent vis-à-vis the US dollar and by more than 30 percent vis-à-vis the Japanese Yen. This decline has triggered the beginning of coordinated central bank intervention by Europe, the US and Japan to support the weak currency. Are these developments worrisome for the Greek government? Does the weakness of Euro signify structural difficulties that might prevent Europe from sustaining a single currency in the long-run? In other words, is the Greek economy getting ready to board another Titanic? Or are these just temporary developments caused by the recent rise in oil prices and will be alleviated by a combination of government policies and the evolution of the new global economy? 1 Even if the present Euro-pains are temporary, the Greek economy might not be ready to join a successful European Monetary Union. The loss of monetary autonomy, the opportunity to establish the drachma as a vehicle currency for several Balkan countries, and its special national defense needs that might require temporary budget deficits are some of the opportunity costs of adopting the Euro. These costs should be compared to the benefits of eliminating the foreign exchange risk, fiscal and monetary discipline, and participation in all levels of decision making within the European Union.
On the 19 th of June 2000, Greece was accepted by EU Council as the 12 th participant of the Euro area as of the 1 st of January 2001, following an assessment that it fulfils the necessary conditions on the basis of the convergence criteria. Whether the past actions of Greece that lead to this policy decision and the effects of the adoption of Euro will turn out to be positive or negative is the concern of the present paper.
Pessimistic views on EMU are usually cast around the argument that the single European currency will be harmful unless the EU satisfies "Optimum Currency Area" (OCA) conditions. For this purpose, we utilize a theory of the optimum currency areas and adopt its insights to answer the question of whether an area can sustain a single currency in the long-run. Moreover, we summarize the recent structural developments in the Greek economy especially those related to the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty that determine whether a country can adopt the Euro.
Our analysis with respect to the effects of EMU on the overall welfare of Greece is based on two scenarios. The first scenario assumes that Europe is a sustainable Single Currency Area (SCA). In this case, Greece benefits from joining EMU and enjoys higher standards of living. The second scenario we consider is that Europe is not a sustainable SCA. In this case, a future currency crisis that could lead to the collapse of Euro might have detrimental economic consequences for Greece.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we state the convergence criteria for joining the EMU and we provide a graphical exposition of whether Greece should adopt the Euro based on a theory of optimum currency areas. In section 3, we summarize the recent structural developments in the Greek economy in an effort to evaluate the consequences of meeting the convergence criteria for the adoption of the Euro. Section 4 discusses the long-run growth and income distribution consequences for the Greek economy associated with the successful adoption of the Euro. Section 5 summarizes the basic results and concludes.
Institutional Background

Convergence criteria
The timetable for monetary union under a single currency is scheduled to occur in three separate stages. The first stage began in 1990 with the removal of controls on financial capital movements within the EU. The second stage started in 1994 with the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), based in Frankfurt, Germany. The Institute is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the move to monetary union and will gradually take the role of supranational central bank. The third stage started in 1999 when the Euro was lunched. Prior to the final stage, a European Central Bank is created and takes over some of the responsibilities of the EMI. During the first and second phases, nations are expected to bring their monetary and fiscal policies into harmony. In order to judge when individual national policies are in agreement, the EU developed a set of convergence criteria.
The transition process from the EMS fixed exchange rate system to EMU was spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty, signed by European leaders in December 1991. The Maastricht Treaty specified a set of macroeconomic convergence criteria that EU countries would need to satisfy to qualify for admission to EMU. The main economic performance criteria are:
1. The country's inflation rate must be no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three EU member states with the lowest inflation. 2. The country must have maintained a stable exchange rate within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) without devaluing on its own initiative. 3. The country must have a public-sector deficit no higher than 3 percent of its GDP.
4. The country must have a public debt that is below or approaching a reference level of 60 percent of its GDP. 5. The country's long-term interest rates must be no higher than 2 percentage points above those of the best three EU member states with the lowest long-run interest rates.
A Stability and Growth Pact (SPG), devised by EU leaders in 1997 at Germany's insistence, may, in theory, restrict the flexibility of EMU members to carry out fiscal policy at the national level. The SPG sets out medium run targets for low government budget deficits and a timetable for the imposition of financial penalties for countries that fail to deal with sustained budget deficits. The SPG and EMU together could therefore deprive individual countries in the Euro zone of national fiscal as well as monetary policy. A major purpose of the convergence criteria was to reassure voters in lowinflation countries such as Germany that the new, jointly managed European currency would be as resistant to inflation as the deutschemark had been.
What is the economic rationale for the establishment of the above-mentioned convergence criteria? Standard international finance theory can illuminate the answer to this question. Criterion 1 can be justified on the grounds of the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach to exchange rate determination, which relates the exchange rate between two currencies to the ratio of the two national price levels. One version of the PPP approach to exchange rates states that in the long-run the rate of depreciation of the domestic vis-à-vis a foreign currency equals the difference between the long-run domestic and the foreign inflation rates. In other words, all members of a single currency area should maintain the same inflation rate in the long-run.
Criterion 2 is self explanatory, and criteria 3 and 4 impose absolute (as opposed to relative) economic performance criteria and put upper limits on public deficits and public debt respectively. These limits ensure that the government of the prospective member will not be subject to inflationary pressures resulting from high deficits, which increase the borrowing needs of the government to service the debt, generate expectations for future depreciation of the currency, and result in capital outflows and speculative attacks on the currency. In addition, high public deficits and debt would force the European Central Bank to purchase government debt and consequently increase the money supply and generate inflation. Finally, criterion 5 has its roots on the asset approach to exchange rate determination. According to this approach, exchange rates are governed by the interest rate parity condition, which equalizes the domestic interest rate to the foreign one plus the expected depreciation rate of the domestic currency. If the interest rates between two countries are the same, then the financial markets expect that the future value of the exchange rate will be the same as the spot exchange rate. In other words, the current exchange rate will not change in some future date.
It should be emphasized that the intent of these convergence criteria is to facilitate financial discipline and convergence, and they do not necessarily guarantee improved economic performance. The latter includes measures of welfare associated with growth in GNP per capita, technological progress, income distribution, unemployment, savings and investment. In the case of Greece, it would be interesting to address the question of whether meeting the financial convergence criteria was achieved at the costs of real economic performance. This question will be addressed in section 3.
The GG-LL Model: A Geometric Exposition
There is little doubt that the European monetary integration process has helped advance the political goals of its founders by giving the European Union a stronger influence in international affairs. The survival and future development of the European monetary experiment depend more heavily, however, on its ability to help countries reach their economic goals. A country's decision to fix its exchange rate can in principle lead to economic benefits as well as sacrifices.
To weigh the economic costs of joining a group of countries with mutually fixed exchange rates against the advantages, we need an analytical framework for thinking systematically about the macroeconomic policy autonomy a country sacrifices and the gains in efficiency and credibility it may reap. To this end, we will utilize the insights of a theory of optimum currency areas, which predicts that fixed exchange rates are most appropriate for areas closely integrated through international trade and factor movements.
Consider now the question of whether Greece should join the Euro zone (single currency area) or not. We begin by deriving the first two elements in the diagram below (Figure 1 ), a schedule called GG (letter "G" stands for "gains") that shows the potential gains to Greece, if it adopts the Euro. A major economic benefit of sustainable fixed exchange rates is that they simplify economic calculations and provide a more predictable basis for decisions that involve international transactions than do floating rates. The monetary efficiency gain from joining the fixed exchange rate system equals the joiner's saving from avoiding the uncertainty, confusion, and calculation and transaction costs that arise when exchange rates float.
2 In other words, by adopting the Euro the Greek economy will end up with lower costs of foreign exchange transactions including time costs for international travelers, reporting prices in different currencies for businesses etc. The monetary efficiency gain from adopting the Euro will be higher for Greece the higher is the magnitude of economic transactions between Greece and the EMU. The monetary efficiency gain from the adoption of Euro will also be higher if factors of production can migrate freely between Greece and the Euro area. Greeks who invest in Euro zone countries benefit when the returns on their investments are more predictable. Similarly, Greeks who work in Euro zone countries may benefit if a fixed exchange rate makes their wages more stable relative to Greece's cost of living.
In practice, it may be hard to attach a precise number to the monetary efficiency gain Greece would enjoy as a result of adopting the Euro. According to the Commission of the European Communities (1990) , the establishment of a single currency might bring savings as large as one percent of the average country's national income. Perhaps this figure represents a lower bound of the potential savings for the case of Greece considering the country's small size relative to the EMU. The GG schedule in Figure 1 shows Greece's monetary efficiency gain from joining the Euro zone as a function of Greece's economic integration with the rest of Europe.
Figure 1: Greece's Decision Whether to Adopt the Euro
Membership in a single currency area may involve economic costs. These costs arise because by joining the Euro zone Greece gives up its ability to use the exchange rate and monetary policies for the purpose of stabilizing output and employment. This economic stability loss incurred by Greece from joining, like its monetary efficiency gain, is related to its economic integration with its exchange rate partners. In order to understand the nature of the stabilization cost loss, start with a hypothetical countryspecific shock, say an increase in political instability in the Balkans that reduces the number of tourists visiting Greece and results in less exports and less foreign exchange earnings for the country. Under flexible exchange rates, this shock would cause a depreciation in the drachma that makes Greek exports cheaper, stimulates employment and reduces the magnitude of a possible recession. If Greece adopts the Euro, the same external shock would cause a deeper recession because the drachma can not depreciate and neither Greece can use fiscal policy (say reduce the interest rate or increase its budget deficit) to stimulate employment. According to Keynesian economic analysis, under a Euro regime, a reduction in exports would cause unemployment. The economy will adjust by reducing wages as unemployed workers try to find jobs, and by causing a decline in goods prices, which will stimulate employment and exports. In other words, the loss of national autonomy in monetary and fiscal policy associated with the adoption of Euro creates a stabilization loss relative to the stabilization loss associated with maintaining a flexible exchange rate regime.
It is easy to see that the stabilization loss associated with the adoption of Euro decreases with the degree of economic integration between Greece and the countries in the Euro zone. Any given decline in prices will stimulate output (exports from Greece to the EMU countries) more the higher is the level of trade in goods and services between Greece and its European partners. In addition, the more integrated factor markets (labor and capital) are between Greece and the Euro-zone countries, the easier is to reduce unemployment in Greece, either through an outflow of labor (i.e., Greek workers migrate to Europe), or through capital flows from Europe (i.e., lower wages in Greece would trigger European companies to increase their production or establish new factories in Greece). These arguments are reflected in the shape of the LL schedule ("L" stands for "loss") in Figure 1 . It shows that Greece's economic stability loss from joining the Euro zone falls as the Greece's economic integration with the zone rises. Figure 1 illustrates how Greece should decide whether or not to adopt the Euro. The Figure implies that Greece should do so, if the degree of economic integration between Greek markets and those of the Euro zone is at least 1 , the integration level determined by the intersection of GG and LL at point 1. According to Figure 1 , for levels of economic integration below θ 1 the GG schedule lies below the LL schedule. Thus, the loss Greece would suffer from greater output and employment instability after joining exceeds the monetary efficiency gain, and the country would be better off without joining the Euro zone.
When the degree of integration is higher than θ 1 , however, the monetary efficiency gain measured by GG is greater than the stability sacrifice measured by LL, and pegging the drachma's exchange rate against the Euro results in a net gain for Greece. Thus, the intersection of GG and LL determines the minimum integration level (here θ 1 ) at which Greece will desire to peg its currency to the Euro.
The GG-LL model suggests a theory of optimum currency areas and can be used to illustrate the features of a sustainable single currency area. Optimum currency areas are groups of regions with economies closely linked by trade in good and services and by factor mobility. This result follows from our finding that a single currency area will best serve the economic interests of Greece if the degree of output and factor trade between the Euro-zone economies and Greece is high.
The interesting question and the critical one for evaluating Greece's decision to adopt the Euro is whether Europe itself makes up an optimum currency area. We discuss this topic next.
Is Europe a Sustainable Single Currency Area?
An optimum currency area (OCA) is an economic unit composed of regions affected symmetrically by disturbances and between which labor and other factors of production flow freely (Mundell, 1961) . The theory of optimum currency areas gives us a useful framework for thinking about the considerations that determine whether a group of countries will gain or loose by adopting a single currency. It should be also noted however that this theory is based on Keynesean analytical principles and assumptions that have been seriously questioned by economists when dealing with several different areas in macroeconomics. A nation's gains and losses from joining a single currency area are hard to measure empirically. However, by combining our theory with information on past economic performance, we can roughly assess whether Greece's monetary efficiency gains are greater than its economic stability loss from joining EMU.
There are two interrelated questions regarding the future of the Euro. First, is Europe itself a natural sustainable single currency area? Second, do European governments have the political will to create and maintain a single currency area? A negative answer to both questions necessarily implies that the expected net benefits from adopting the Euro will be at best short lived.
The answer to the first question is not clear and many prominent economists have been divided into Euro-pessimists and Euro-optimists. On the positive side, the overall degree of economic integration within the EMU countries can be judged by looking at the integration of product and factor markets, that is, the extend of trade in goods and services and the ease with which labor and capital move across EU countries. Most EU members export from 10 to 20 percent of their output to other EU members. These numbers are larger than those for EU-U.S. trade, which is only around 2 percent of U.S. GNP and an even smaller percentage of EU GNP, but much smaller than the amount of trade across different regions of the United States. If we take trade relative to GNP as a measure of economic integration, the GG-LL model suggests that a joint float of Europe's currencies against the rest of the world is a better strategy for EU members than a fixed dollar/Euro exchange rate would be. And the above numbers are consistent with the notion that the U.S. enjoys a much higher degree of economic integration than Europe. It should be pointed out though that it took the United States at least one hundred and fifty years and several financial crises to become an OCA. According to estimated data for 1999, Greece has a ratio of foreign trade to GDP of 20.7% for exports and 28.2% for imports. In 1998 exports to other EU Member States made up 52.3% of total Greek exports and 65.9% of Greek imports originated from other EU countries. It is worth mentioning that Greece's intra-EU trade-to-GDP ratio is the lowest in the EU. Transportation costs associated with the geographic location of Greece relative to the rest of Europe might partially account for this finding. This suggests that Europe is an optimum currency area and there are potential benefits for Greece as the adoption of Euro will lead to further economic integration.
Recent economic literature dealing with the effects of a common currency on trade indicates that the increase in trade stemming from a common currency is one of the few undisputed gains from EMU. Even EMU-skeptics, such as Feldstein (1997) , agree that substituting a single currency for several national currencies reduces the transaction costs of trade within that group of countries. Indeed, this was one of the official motivations behind the EMU project (European Commission, 1990) . Andrew Rose (1999) uses panel data that includes bilateral observations for five years spanning 1970 through 1990 for 186 countries to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade. His findings imply that two countries that share the same currency trade three times as much they would with different currencies.
How about the degree of factor market integration among European countries? A number of authors have used other continental economies already possessing a common currency and a free internal market to address this issue. For example, Boltho (1989) compared regional income and growth rate disparities within the United States and the European Community. For 1983, the coefficient of variation of per capita incomes was 0.25 for 12 EC members, but only 0.10 for 9 U.S. census regions. This would appear to be strong evidence of the effects of greater factor mobility within the United States. When the same statistic is calculated for only 9 EC members (excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain), however, if falls to 0.16. Poloz (1990) contrasted the variability of relative prices across Canadian regions and the variability of real exchange rates across four European countries. He found that real exchange rates between Canadian provinces were actual more variable than real exchange rates between France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany. The reason for this difference is that Canadian provinces are highly specialized in production, whereas France and Germany are diversified economies. In Eichengreen (1990b) , the balance of payments adjustment and regional labor market dynamics within the United States have been analyzed. He found evidence of faster labor market adjustment between U.S. regions than between EC members, although the difference was not large. Eichengreen (1992) compares the variability of real exchange rates across EU member states and U.S. regions on the grounds that movements in relative price levels are required to maintain internal and external balance when shocks are asymmetric. It documents higher levels of real-exchange-rate variability between EU member states than between U.S. regions, suggesting that shocks are more asymmetric in Europe and pointing to problems from eliminating the exchange rate as an instrument for adjusting relative prices. He also looks at the roles of labor mobility and fiscal federalism in accommodating disturbances to U.S. regions, using a case study the automobileproducing state of Michigan following the oil-price shocks of the 1970s. He found that both mechanisms are more highly developed in the United States, suggesting difficulties with the operation of a European monetary union.
Most empirical work quantifies the asymmetric shocks of the theory of optimum currency areas utilizing cross-country differences in rates of economic growth. Baymoumi and Eichengreen (1993b) distinguish aggregate-supply and aggregate demand disturbances and estimate the model for eleven European countries. The results distinguish an EU core, made up of Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, in which supply shocks are small and well correlated across countries, and EU periphery, comprised of the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, in which supply shocks are larger and less well correlated. They also find that supply shocks to U.S. regions are more symmetric than supply shocks to European countries.
The above mentioned studies provide mixed evidence on whether Europe is a sustainable single currency area without a clear-cut answer. Euro-optimists, including many academic economists in both sides of the Atlantic Ocean and the European governments, believe that the future of Euro is bright and that the costs associated with fixing the exchange rates within Europe are, at worst, minimal. The advocates of Euro support their view by pointing out the remarkable economic adjustment to meet the convergence criteria established by the treaty of Maastricht: In 1996, for example, only one country, Luxembourg, met all three criteria of inflation, public debt and public deficit. Four years later, all EMU members met these criteria and the only delay in the lunching of the new currency is related to the slower than anticipated process of printing the new currency.
On the other hand, Euro-pessimists include many academic economists, politicians and labor leaders who view the establishment of the new currency as a device to shift the burden of macroeconomic adjustment from financial and product markets to labor markets. Opponents to EMU point out to the continuous decline of the Euro vis-à-vis the dollar and the yen since its introduction in the start of 1999 as a signal of a potential disaster, and view the high level of unemployment and the reduction of social programs associated with the adjustment process as structural barriers that will prevent the realization of economic benefits for the participants in the EMU, at least in the short run.
The above paragraphs indicate that the road to EMU has had several ups and downs and the potential benefits have not been realized yet. However, despite these difficulties, the European governments have shown great determination in meeting the convergence criteria and taking all the necessary steps to assure the creation of a single currency area.
Greece's Financial Convergence to the EMU
Economic developments in Greece
In this section, we summarize available evidence from Greece on economic convergence, by examining the evolution of key economic indicators related to the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria. These indicators include the development of prices, government fiscal positions, and long-run interest rates. The method we use to analyze the evidence is the following: First, evidence from the 1990s is reviewed from a backward-looking perspective. This should help to better determine whether current achievements are primarily the result of genuine structural adjustments, which in turn should lead to a better assessment of whether economic convergence is sustainable. Second, and to the extent appropriate, a forward-looking perspective is adopted. In this context particular attention is drawn to the fact that the sustainability of favorable developments hinges critically on appropriate and lasting policy responses to existing and future challenges.
The Minister of National Economy and Finance of Greece addressed a letter to the President of the ECB on 9 March 2000, requesting the evaluation of Greece's application regarding the abrogation of its status as a Member State with a derogation. Therefore, the reference (target) period, for which the success or failure of converge is examined, is from April 1999 to March 2000.
Price developments
Since 1998 the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) inflation in Greece has been significantly reduced, and recently came closer to a level which can generally be considered to be consistent with price stability. This recent reduction in inflation rates is partly attributable to temporary factors.
Cuts in indirect taxes were introduced gradually between October 1998 and December 1999. The ECB estimates that the impact of such cuts has reduced Greek consumer price inflation over the reference period from April 1999 to March 2000 by around 0.9 percentage point on average. The direct downward effect of these cuts on inflation will disappear one year after their introduction and the 12-month inflation rate will then be higher again. In this sense cuts in indirect taxes have only a temporary "one-off" effect on rates of inflation and do not represent a sustainable move towards price stability. Furthermore, such measures have also secondary inflation-reducing effects because they have contributed to reducing the effect of wage catch-up clauses. Finally, they may have a more lasting effect by lowering inflation expectations, although it is not possible to quantify the latter with any degree of precision.
Starting in August 1998, the Greek Government also concluded a number of gentleman's agreements with commercial and industrial enterprises as well as service providers. The aim of these agreements was to reduce the retail prices in a number of goods roughly corresponding to one-tenth of the CPI basket. According to Bank of Greece estimates, during 1998 price increases for the items covered by such agreements remained below the overall rate of increase of consumer prices. This translates into a reduction in inflation of about 0.2 percentage points for the year 1998.
Looking back beyond the most recent developments, a clear trend towards lower rates of inflation in Greece has been discernible since the early 1990s. Consumer price inflation, as measured on the basis of the CPI, decreased steadily from 10.9% in 1994 to 2.1% in 1999 (see Figure 2 below ). This process of disinflation reflects a number of important policy choices, most notably the progressive tightening of monetary policy during the 1990s. The primary objective of Greece's monetary policy is to maintain price stability, with the latter related to a target of an annual increase in the consumer price index of below 2%. To this end, the authorities maintained a tight monetary police stance throughout the 1990s. In April 1999 the Bank of Greece introduced temporary reserve requirements on the growth of bank credit to the private sector. High official interest rates aimed at facilitating the move towards price stability also supported the drachma's position in foreign exchange markets. The reduction in inflation was supported by adjustments in fiscal policy aimed at lower public deficit ratios. Growth in compensation per employee was reduced from a peak of 12.2% in 1995 to 4.8% in 1999, while growth in unit labor costs declined from 11.6% to 2.5% respectively. These reductions were supported by strong productivity growth and a two-year collective bargaining agreement reached in May 1998, which generated moderate wage increases. A reduction in inflation is also shown in other relevant measures of inflation such as the producer price index.
Fiscal developments
In the year 1999 the general government deficit ratio was 1.6%, well below the 3% reference (target) value, although the debt-to-GDP ratio was 104.4%, i.e. far above the 60% reference value. In November 1999 the EU Council abrogated its decision that an excessive deficit existed in Greece. In 2000 the deficit ratio is forecast to decrease to 1.3%, while the debt ratio is projected to decline to 103.7%. Figure 3 shows that Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen during the period 1994-2000.
Figure 3: Public debt-Comparison among Greece, EU, and U.S.A
Looking back over the years from 1990 to 1999, Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 24.7 percentage points. What were the prime determinants for this increase? The most significant increase was related to deficit-debt adjustments (i.e. all the factors that impact the debt ratio except government deficits and the effect of changes in GDP). In the case of Greece, the deficit-debt adjustments with an upward effect on government debt came mainly from the revaluation of government debt denominated in foreign currency following the devaluation of the Greek drachma and from transactions in financial assets. Revaluation of foreign currency denominated debt increased the debt-to-GDP ratio throughout the 1990s. From the mid-1990s, equity injections in a number of public enterprises and banks and the assumption by the general government of public enterprise debt had also a considerable contribution to the level of public debt. The cumulative deficit-debt adjustments amounted to GRD 5.4 trillion over the years from 1995 to 1999, or 14% of GDP in 1999. The high significance of such deficit-debt adjustments explains why Greece's public debt has fallen only slowly in recent years, despite continued fiscal consolidation, and they would have been even higher had there not been high receipts from selling several public enterprises to the private sector.
Since 1994, Greece's public deficit (as a percentage of GDP) has tended to converge towards the average public deficit of the EU countries and that of the U.S. as During the 1990s, a pattern of first worsening and then improving deficit-to-GDP ratios can be observed. Starting from a ratio of 15.9% of GDP in 1990, the deficit declined to 11.4% in 1991. Subsequently, the public deficit declined steadily as a percent of GDP, with only a temporary halt in 1995, falling to 3.1% in 1998 and declining further to 1.6% in 1999, i.e. below the reference value. The fiscal adjustment was, to a large extent, due to a significant increase in the general government primary surplus from 5.7% of GDP in 1997 to 6.4% in 1998. The very high primary surplus combined with privatization proceeds, close to 3% of GDP, led to a fall in the general government debt to GDP ratio from 108.5% in 1997 to 105.4% in 1998, overshooting the corresponding Converging Program of 1998 target, set by the Greek government, by 2.4 percentage points.
Long-term interest rate developments
During the 1990s long-term interest rates followed a broadly declining trend from the very high levels observed in the early 1990s. Since 1993 Greek long-term interest rates have tended to converge towards the rates of those EU countries with the lowest bond yields, apart from the second half of 1997 and again in late 1998, when international financial turbulence interrupted the general trend of convergence. The main factors underlying the convergence trend were the significant decline in the inflation differential, which, to a large extent, was due to Greek monetary having a favorable influence on Greek inflation and inflation expectations, as well as to the recent improvement in the country's fiscal position. The substantial decline in long-run interest rate has stimulated the Greek economy and this effect can be expected to continue to exert an expansionary influence on the economy if the convergence of Greek interest rates toward Euro area levels continues. Figure 5 below shows the evolution of the long-interest rates for Greece, Euro area, and U.S.A. 
Is Greece Passing Because Europe is Failing?
The discussion on whether Europe is indeed a sustainable single currency area raises the following hypothetical question regarding the assessment of Greece's economic policies during its attempt to meet the convergence criteria. Did Greece meet the relative criteria of inflation and interest rates because European inflation and interest rates were rising during the adjustment period? In other words, if Europe was an ideal optimum currency area, would Greece be able to satisfy the relative performance criteria? One way to provide an answer to this question is to consider the U.S. performance (as an ideal single currency area) and to ask whether Greece's inflation rate was less than 1.5 percent higher than the U.S. inflation rate for the last two years; and whether Greece's long-term interest rates were no higher than two percentage points above the U.S. interest rates. The answer to this question is affirmative. Greece would have satisfied these two criteria even if the U.S. were used as a reference point (see Figures 2 and 5 above) . In other words, there is no doubt in our minds that the Greek government made remarkable progress in driving the economy closer to the path of financial convergence to both the EMU and the U.S. economies.
What were the real costs of this adjustment process for the Greek economy? Fiscal and monetary disciplines usually imply increase in the rate of unemployment, reduction in expenditures for social programs, slower economic growth and a reduction in public expenditure for education and infrastructure. Unfortunately, the evidence supports an increase in these real costs during the period of financial convergence to the EMU. 
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Implications of the Euro for Long-run Growth and Income Distribution
Economic growth and income distributions are two of the most important components of economic performance. Maintaining a high-growth rate enhances the improvement in Greece's standards of living and accelerates the process of real convergence between Greece and Europe. As Figure 6 below indicates, the income per capita of Greece has been converged with that of the EU since 1995. Recent developments in the theory of growth allow us to identify several potential benefits and costs associated with both growth and income distribution considerations. 4 Although there is a long-list of potential costs and benefits, we will concentrate on the impact of the Euro on economic mechanisms that directly influence the two primary components of welfare: growth and income inequality.
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Consider the effects of inflation and the elimination of foreign exchange risk. Greece will import the monetary policy of Europe, bringing inflation down towards European levels. A decrease in inflation and the elimination of foreign exchange risk will decrease interest rates, increase savings and investment and stimulate capital accumulation and growth in income per capita.
In addition, if Greece adopts the Euro, it will become part of a large Euro bloc. Greek companies will be able to participate in a system of more complete and "deeper" financial markets and reduce considerably their borrowing costs. Participation in well functioning financial markets (including venture capital markets) is an important ingredient in the success of start up companies introducing or adopting new processes and products. This in turn will accelerate the evolution of technology that is responsible for the bulk of per capita growth in the long run.
Another channel by which the adoption of Euro will affect positively the acceleration of economic growth is the increased flexibility in labor markets. Better 4 See, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1998) for an exposition of modern growth theory. 5 Grubel (2000) presents an excellent discussion and explanation of gains and losses accruing to a country that joins a monetary union although his analysis is in the context of the merit of a Canada -US monetary union. Divergence Convergence public budget discipline and deficit reduction will exercise pressure for more privatization and more competition and efficiency in strategic infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications, energy, and transportation. In addition, the adoption of the Euro will put pressure for more labor market discipline in unionized sectors. Labor unions usually negotiate higher wages and fringe benefits for their members compared to nonunionized firms. Frequently, these higher wages are reflected partly in higher product prices especially in imperfectly competitive product markets where firms can pass the higher costs to consumers. As a result, the international competitiveness of these firms declines (i.e., exports are reduced) and often the government restores this competitiveness by depreciating the currency (to make exports cheaper) through expansionary monetary policy. This mechanism can ignite cycles of increasing prices followed by increasing wages, currency depreciation and inflation. The adoption of the Euro will break these cycles, because the central bank in Greece will not be able to depreciate the currency and offer protection to unionized firms that loose their competitiveness. Neither will the Greek government be able to subsidize these firms by running budget deficits. As a result, labor unions will either refrain from demanding inflationary wage increases, or risk unemployment for their members, as higher prices that are not matched by productivity increases could reduce output demanded and induce firms to substitute cheaper capital for labor. In either case, there will be more market discipline and increased efficiency in the labor market as wages will be closer to the marginal product of labor. An economic regime with higher efficiency in labor markets will increase the value of human capital and raise its supply. A higher supply of skilled workers will in turn stimulate the process of technological progress by increasing the availability of scientists and engineers, inducing more foreign investment, and facilitating the process of technology transfer to Greece.
Real convergence with EU (Growth of GDP as %)
The potential benefits of higher long-run growth have to be compared to the potential costs of increasing income disparities and especially the acceleration of wage income inequality within Greece, that the high-growth scenario might bring. It is obvious, that the importation of European monetary policy is a mixed blessing for income inequality. On the one hand, lower inflation benefits the poor more that the rich since the latter have higher ability to hedge against inflation by keeping their wealth abroad or investing in assets that are immune to inflation. On the other hand, budgetary discipline might reduce the ability of the government to help the poor through targeted social programs, although this difficulty might be partially alleviated because higher growth would bring more tax revenue to the government.
Finally, the wage income inequality measured by the relative wage differential between skilled and less skilled workers will be directly affected by a greater degree of integration between the Greek and European economies through three additional channels. First, according to the traditional Stolper and Samuelson (1941) mechanism, more inter-industry trade (i.e., trade across industries) will help those sectors in Greece that use less skilled workers intensively since Greece has a higher abundance of less skilled workers than Europe. The price of less skilled labor products will increase as their production expands to satisfy the increased demand for these products, and the relative wage of skilled workers will fall. This mechanism will reduce the wage income inequality.
Second, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) have identified the Schumpeterian mechanism of income distribution that provides a dynamic link between financial markets and wage income inequality. According to the Schumpeterian mechanism financial convergence will increase the price of capital (investment) products relative to consumption goods (empirically, this can be seen in higher stock market valuation of firms which reflects the price of assets relative to consumption and it is correlated to price of capital goods and intangible assets like R&D). Since the production of capital goods (or R&D services) utilizes a higher proportion of skilled workers than less skilled ones, we conjecture that financial integration will increase the demand for skilled workers and reduce the demand for less skilled workers. This in turn will worsen the income inequality between the two groups by either increasing the relative wage of skilled workers or by increasing the unemployment rate and labor turnover among less skilled workers.
Third, Dinopoulos et al. (2000) have identified the Chamberlinian mechanism of wage income inequality that operates in markets characterized by intra-industry (within industries) trade, scale economies and product differentiation. As firms located in Greece expand their size as a result of more export opportunities coupled with scale economies, the relative demand for more skilled workers will increase. In practice, larger firms tend to hire a higher proportion of skilled workers compared to their smaller counterparts.
6 More intra-industry trade, more mergers and acquisitions that would increase the average size of local or foreign firms operating in Greece, induced by the adoption of Euro, would worsen the income inequality between more and less skilled workers. We suspect that all the above-mentioned income-distribution mechanisms would operate simultaneously and would determine how the long-run growth benefits would be distributed among different groups within Greece. The net effect on income distribution will depend on their empirical relevance and relative strength.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzed the impact of the adoption of the Euro on the Greek economy. Towards this end, we utilized the insights of the theory of optimum currency areas, which is based on Keynesian macroeconomic theory, we addressed the question of whether Europe is as sustainable single currency area and analyze the Maastricht converge criteria which established the financial foundations of the Euro. We concluded that the degree of economic integration among the participants in the EMU is high enough to justify the adoption of a common currency, but the integration of product and factor markets in Europe is less than that of an ideal single currency area approximated in practice by the US economy. Although the road towards monetary integration in Europe has been a bumpy one, we consider ourselves as Euro-optimists and believe that there is sufficient determination among the European governments to follow the right policies and maintain a single currency at least for the foreseeable future.
There is no doubt in our minds that the Greek government has successfully met the financial convergence criteria and has earned the right to participate in the EMU by adopting the Euro in 2001. The economic performance of Greece has been impressive in terms of the convergence criteria based on the following considerations: First, even if Europe were an ideal single currency area and her economy was behaving as that of the US, Greece would have met the convergence criteria for a monetary union. Second, the financial convergence with Europe was achieved even if the war in Yugoslavia created a negative shock for the Greek economy, and even if national elections in Greece increased the demand for more government spending. The adjustment costs triggered by policies aimed at financial convergence with Europe included higher unemployment, and a reduction in social programs and public investment in public infrastructure and education.
This analysis supports our conclusion that the determination of the Greek government on meeting the Maastricht criteria will continue after the adoption of Euro. In this case, it is natural to discuss the potential long-run benefits and costs of adopting the Euro. Toward this end, we used the new developments in growth theory to address the impact of Euro on long-run growth and income distribution. The general conclusion from this analysis is that participation in the Euro zone has the potential of higher economic growth at the cost of serious income disparities within Greece. Clearly, there is a lot of uncertainty about the nature of future economic policy and the role of the Greek government in adopting policies that aim at increasing the efficiency gains from financial and economic integration and generating higher growth, and at the same time dealing with potential income disparities through social programs, transfers to the poor, and more educational subsidies. The latter will mitigate the potential increase in wage income inequality between skilled and less skilled workers.
